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We use the EBA capital exercise of 2011 as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how capital requirements
affect various measures of bank solvency risk. We show that, while regulatory measures of solvency improve,
non-regulatory measures indicate a deterioration in bank solvency in response to higher capital requirements.
The decline in bank solvency is driven by a permanent reduction in banks’ market value of equity. This
finding is consistent with a reduction in bank profitability, rather than a repricing of bank equity due to a
reduction of implicit and explicit too-big-too-fail guarantees. We then discuss alternative policies to improve
bank solvency.
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I. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 precipitated broad regulatory reforms intended to make the
financial system more robust. At the heart of these reforms were efforts to strengthen regulatory
capital buffers of banks. For instance, Basel III increased the minimum Tier 1 capital requirement
from 4% to 6%, with substantial scope for further capital buffers. Increased buffer requirements have
made banks substantially more robust when considering regulatory measures of bank capitalization.
They have lead policy-makers to conclude that the financial system is significantly more resilient
to fluctuations in asset values today, compared to before the crisis (Yellen, 2018). Empirical work
on market-based measures of systemic risk has found evidence for a decline in systemic fragility
since the U.S. financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, respectively (see Engle, 2018,
for a recent survey on systemic risk). At the same time, the view that risk has decreased on all
fronts after the financial crisis is not unanimously accepted in the literature. For example, Sarin
and Summers (2016) show descriptive evidence suggesting that, based on non-regulatory measures
of risk, such as volatility and systematic risk, banks are as risky or even riskier compared to before
the crisis. Hence, over ten years after the financial crisis, there is still substantial uncertainty and
debate regarding the effectiveness of capital requirements in terms of reducing bank insolvency risk.
The goal of our paper is to inform this debate by investigating how and why capital requirements
affect a large set of bank risk measures. Most importantly, we focus on both the Core Tier 1
capital ratio as a regulatory measure and other non-regulatory measures in order to get a complete
picture of the relationship between capital requirements and bank solvency. Our non-regulatory
measures consist of accounting-based metrics (the inverse of the z-score), market-based bank-level
metrics (systematic risk, stock return volatility, market leverage, and Value-at-Risk) and systemic
risk measures (Marginal Expected Shortfall (Acharya et al., 2017), SRISK (Brownlees and Engle,
2017), and ∆COVAR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016)).1
Identifying the causal effects of higher capital requirements on risk is challenging. Given that
capital requirements are meant to address insolvency risk, there is a strong concern of reverse
causality running from bank risk to capital. Moreover, due to confounding factors affecting both
1Many of these non-regulatory measures, such as market leverage, are shown to be a better predictor of bank
solvency compared to regulatory measures (Haldane and Madouros, 2012).
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policy-makers’ decisions to increase capital requirements and a bank’s risk, the estimated effect of
higher capital requirements on a bank’s risk from a simple OLS regression is likely to be biased.
To identify the causal effect of higher capital requirements on bank risk, we therefore exploit the
2011 capital exercise conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA) as a quasi-natural
experiment, which led to an increase in the Core Tier 1 capital requirement to 9% for a subset of
European banks (“EBA banks”). Due to the selection rule for assigning whether a bank would
face an increase in capital requirements, treatment status for banks was based on observables, and
there was substantial variation in treatment status conditional on these observables.
Our paper is inspired by Gropp et al. (2019). They exploit the 2011 EBA capital exercise as
a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how banks adjust to higher capital requirements. They
document that banks participating in the EBA capital exercise increase their CT1 ratios primarily
by lowering risk-weighted assets. Our paper relates to their paper by taking an additional step and
asking what this adjustment implies for bank risk. While lower risk-weighted assets can imply lower
risk, some evidence - especially prior to the financial crisis - could suggest otherwise due to, for
instance, underreporting of risk (see, e.g., Engle, 2018). Moreover, by reallocating their portfolio,
bank charter value, which ultimately is an important determinant for many risk-metrics, could be
affected (Sarin and Summers, 2016).
We exploit the EBA capital exercise by employing a flexible difference-in-differences approach,
where we compare our risk metrics for EBA banks with non-EBA banks before, during, and after the
EBA capital exercise. We combine data from several sources to perform our analysis. Specifically,
we combine quarterly balance sheet items with market-based data on stock prices and dividend
payouts as well as information on bank credit ratings to arrive at a more detailed picture of the
differential effects of higher capital requirements.
Our findings can be summarized in terms of two broad conclusions. The first conclusion is that
the overall effect of capital requirements on bank risk crucially depends on whether we consider
regulatory or non-regulatory risk measures. Specifically, consistent with Gropp et al. (2019), we
show that banks respond to higher capital requirements by reducing risk-weighted assets and that
this improves regulatory measures of bank solvency. The picture, however, is very different when
we consider non-regulatory measures of bank-level risk. None of the non-regulatory measures we
consider improve as a consequence of the increase in capital requirements. In fact, according to
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several measures, banks become less safe as capital requirements increase. Specifically, (the absolute
value of) Value-at-Risk, the inverse z-score, systematic risk, marginal expected shortfall, market-
based leverage ratio, and SRISK all increase following the tightening of capital requirements. Hence,
based on these non-regulatory measures, the EBA capital exercise failed in terms of increasing bank
solvency.
We then move on to explore why this is the case. Our second conclusion is that a decline
in the market capitalization of treated banks drives the increase in non-regulatory risk measures.
We explore the underlying reasons for this. Specifically, we hypothesize that a decrease in market
capitalization can arise either due to a reduction in profitability, changes in dividend policies, or a
decline in the perceived likelihood of a public bailout. Understanding which of these channels are
driving the results is crucial for the overall welfare implications of higher capital requirements. If
the market capitalization of EBA banks decreases due to lower bailout probabilities, the decline
in market capitalization and associated increase in non-regulatory risk measures can be welfare
improving. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Implied bailout probabilities of
banks provided by rating agencies are unaffected by the EBA capital exercise. Instead, our empirical
analysis shows that the decline in market capitalization is most consistent with reduced profitability
of EBA banks following the treatment. We tie this finding to banks’ response to the capital exercise,
i.e., reducing risk-weighted assets.
We perform several robustness tests to ensure that other confounding factors do not drive our
findings. One worry is that EBA banks are systematically different from non-EBA banks in terms
of the outcomes we consider. While we show - by employing a dynamic difference-in-differences
approach - that this is not the case before the capital exercise, we provide additional corroborative
evidence in the following two ways. First, we focus on a subset of treatment and control banks that
are more similar in terms of size. Second, we compare the evolution of risk-metrics within EBA
banks but across different capital ratio levels before the exercise. Our results remain qualitatively
robust to these alternative approaches. A second worry is that EBA banks and non-EBA banks
were hit by differential shocks during the capital exercise period which lead to a different evolution
in the risk-metrics we consider. A primary concern for this is the differential exposure to the
contemporaneous European sovereign debt crisis. We address this concern in two ways. First,
we include country × year-quarter fixed effects, effectively ensuring that identification comes from
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comparing different types of banks within the same country within a given year-quarter. Second,
we conduct a placebo test where we compare the evolution of the non-regulatory risk measures at
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis and show that the treated banks did not experience a similar
increase in risk metrics then.2
Our paper relates to the broad literature on banks’ response to higher capital requirements, see
for instance Aiyar et al. (2014a,b, 2016), Kisin and Manela (2016), Fraisse et al. (2017), Jiménez
et al. (2017), Célérier et al. (2018), and Juelsrud and Wold (2020). Our identification strategy is
similar to Mésonnier and Monks (2015), Degryse et al. (2018) and Gropp et al. (2019), who rely
on the EBA capital exercise for pinning down the causal effect of higher capital requirements on
bank balance sheet items.3 A related strand of the literature has employed bank stress tests to
study the effects of changes in regulatory bank capital.4 For example, Acharya et al. (2018) find
that stress-tested U.S. banks reduce credit supply to decrease their credit risk. Similar findings are
due to Berrospide and Edge (2019) and Cortés et al. (2020) who show that the stress-test induced
increases in capital requirements cause affected banks to reduce small business and C&I lending,
respectively.
In tandem with the literature on banks’ responses to regulation, a literature on the evolution
of bank solvency has emerged. Sarin and Summers (2016) highlight that market-based measures
of bank risk have surged following the financial crisis. Consistent with this, Chousakos and Gorton
(2017) and Bogdanova et al. (2018) document that banks’ Tobin’s Q has remained low after the
financial crisis and discuss the underlying explanation. Gao et al. (2018) estimate the response
of stock prices and bond yields for large financial institutions in the U.S. after critical events in
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. They document that, on average, large financial institutions
had negative abnormal stock returns and positive abnormal bond returns relative to small and
medium-sized financial institutions in response to critical events. They interpret these findings as
the Dodd-Frank Act being effective in reducing large financial institutions’ risk-taking. Similarly,
2Due to potentially confounding events after the EBA capital exercise, such as additional regulation on large,
complex financial institutions, we focus on the evolution of risk-metrics primarily during the EBA capital exercise.
Our robustness tests help us to validate our identifying assumption during and shortly after the capital exercise.
3In a related study, Bouwman et al. (2018) employ the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act to identify the causal effects of regulation on banks in the U.S. (see also D’Acunto and Rossi, forthcoming, for
an analysis of the regressive redistribution of mortgage originations due to financial regulation after 2011).
4For a discussion of the potential inefficiencies of stress tests based on static risk-weighted assets instead of
dynamic market-based risk measures, cf. Acharya et al. (2014).
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Schäfer et al. (2016) conclude that post-crisis reforms have reduced both bailout expectations and
equity returns for U.S. and European financial institutions. Our paper belongs at the intersection
of these two strands of the literature, by focusing on how capital requirements affect measures of
risk.
Nistor Mutu and Ongena (2018) analyze the impact of several different policy measures on
banks’ contribution and exposure to systemic risk. Specifically, they investigate the effects of
recapitalizations, guarantees, and liquidity injections on systemic risk measures and how the effects
depend on banks’ risk profiles. Two of their findings are that recapitalization reduces the systemic
risk in the short-run, while liquidity injections - especially at longer horizons - tend to elevate
systemic risk. Berger et al. (2020), on the other hand, investigate the evolution of systemic risk
for U.S. banks that participated in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). They find that
banks that participated in the TARP program had lower systemic risk post-intervention and that
larger and ex-ante safer banks drive this. Gehrig and Iannino (2018) compute and describe the
evolution of two systemic risk measures following the introduction of the Basel accord. They show
that measures of systemic risk did not experience a secular decline over the period for which the
various versions of the Basel accord has been implemented.5
Our main contribution to this literature is that we are, as far as we know, the first paper to
identify the causal effect of higher capital requirements on non-regulatory measures of bank risk
and investigate the mechanisms through which banks’ adjustment to higher capital requirements
can fail to decrease and even increase non-regulatory risk measures. Consistent with the descriptive
evidence in Sarin and Summers (2016) and Gehrig and Iannino (2018), we show that higher capital
requirements have unambiguous effects on bank risk and can even trigger an increase in some bank
risk measures. In terms of understanding the mechanism, we show support of the main conjecture
of Sarin and Summers (2016), namely that a decline in market capitalization drives the increase in
risk. Moreover, we show evidence that a reduction in bank profitability drives this decline in market
capitalization. Given that a reduction in risk is the key objective for policymakers considering higher
5Note that market-based measures of systemic risk, some of which we use in our study as well, have been criticized
for not adequately capturing the actual systemic risk, but are just proxies of various aspects related to systemic issues.
For example, Zhang et al. (2015) and Löffler and Raupach (2018) provide a critical perspective on these measures and
their predictive power for crises. We do not take a stance on whether these measures are accurate proxies of overall
systemic risk in the financial sector, but use and interpret them directly as combinations of other non-regulatory
measures we employ.
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capital requirements, our findings have important implications for policy. Specifically, they suggest
that the overall effectiveness of higher capital requirements is much less clear than what is the case
when only considering regulatory risk measures.6 In Section VI, we discuss different strategies for
improving bank solvency in light of our findings.
II. EBA Capital Exercise
The EBA announced its (first) capital exercise on October 26, 2011, following the release of
stress test results on July 15. The objective of the EBA capital exercise was to restore the public’s
confidence in the safety of large European banks by increasing banks’ capital base to a level at
which banks’ could withstand unexpected losses (primarily stemming from sovereign bonds). As
its central provision, the capital exercise required a set of 61 European banks to increase their
minimum Core Tier 1 capital from 5% to 9% by June 2012.7
In line with the exercise’s purpose of strengthening large banks’ capital buffers, inclusion in the
EBA capital exercise was based on the banks’ total assets. To be precise, for each country, banks
were first ranked based on their consolidated assets as of the end of 2010. Banks with total assets
above a country-specific (rather than a common EU-wide) threshold participated in the capital
exercise. This asset threshold was set so that the increase in the capital requirement affected at
least 50% of a national banking sector. Due to regional variation in the structure of national
banking sectors, this threshold rule implied a relatively large variation in the number of banks that
were affected by the increased capital requirements. Countries with banking sectors consisting of
a few large banks would have few banks subject to the new requirement, whereas countries with
many smaller and homogeneous banks in terms of asset size would have many banks subject to the
new requirement.
To meet the new capital requirements, the EBA recommended the selected banks to use ”re-
tained earnings, reduced bonus payments, new issuances of common equity and suitably strong
contingent capital, and other liability management measures” rather than reduce risk-weighted
6As noted by Bahaj and Malherbe (2020), the effects of capital requirements on lending are also ambiguous with
higher capital requirements on the one hand increasing the bank’s weighted average cost of funds and on the other
hand alleviating the “guarantee overhang problem” thus making lending more attractive.
7Even though the exercise was only a recommendation by the EBA, national supervisors were nevertheless required




In this section, we describe how we use the EBA capital exercise in order to pin down the effect
of higher capital requirements on risk metrics (in subsection III.A). We then describe the various
risk metrics we consider (subsection III.B). We close this section off by discussing sample selection
and providing summary statistics (subsection III.C).
A. Identification
Our identification strategy is to compare outcomes between EBA banks and non-EBA banks.
As a baseline, we run a flexible difference-in-differences (see Mora and Reggio, 2012) of the form






γk (1t=k × EBAi) + εi,t
where i indexes bank and t indexes time. Yi,t are different regulatory and non-regulatory risk-
measures, outlined in section III.B. 1t=k represents year-quarter dummies and EBAi is an indicator
for whether bank i is an EBA bank or not. To control for time-invariant unobservable bank
characteristics, we employ bank fixed-effects αi. To account for potential correlation of εi,t across
units, we cluster the estimated standard errors at the country-level.
The identifying assumption we make is that absent the EBA capital exercise, EBA and non-
EBA banks would have similar outcomes of Yi,t conditional on the bank and time fixed effects.
Conditional on this assumption being satisfied, this methodology allows us to map out the dynamic
treatment effects of higher capital requirements. Specifically, γk’s during the treatment period can
be interpreted as the dynamic effect of increased capital requirements on Yi,t.
There are at least two threats to our identifying assumption. The first threat to identification
is that EBA and non-EBA banks have a different evolution in terms of the outcomes we consider
for more structural reasons. Given the difference between EBA banks and non-EBA banks based
on observables such as size and market capitalization that we document in section III.C, this could
be a cause for concern. An advantage of using the specification in equation (1) is that, relative to
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a static difference in difference or a matching estimator, we can explicitly test for this. We do this
by formally testing for whether γk is zero for k prior to the EBA capital exercise. If we cannot
reject the null hypothesis on γk for this sub-period, we take this as supporting evidence for our
identifying assumption.
In addition, we perform three additional analyses based on a more similar subsample of banks.8
In the first subsample analysis (see Online Appendix for details), we restrict attention to only EBA
banks. Our treatment indicator in this setting is the initial Core Tier 1 ratio of the EBA banks at
the end of 2010. The underlying idea behind this identification approach is that EBA banks with a
lower initial capital ratio are more affected by the capital exercise, compared to other banks. In the
second subsample analysis, we restrict attention - wherever possible - to only consider the six banks
closest to the threshold for each country. That is, we take the three largest non-treated banks and
the three smallest treated banks in our sample for a given country and compare the evolution of
the outcomes considered across these two groups. Finally, we follow Gropp et al. (2019) and adopt
a matching approach (see Online Appendix), where EBA banks are matched with non-EBA banks
based on three alternative matching strategies.
The second threat to identification is that - even if EBA and non-EBA banks are comparable
before the capital exercise - they are hit by different shocks during the EBA capital exercise which
in turn affect the outcomes considered differentially. A key concern is that EBA banks could be
more exposed to the sovereign debt crisis or other regulatory proposals9, and that the divergence
in outcomes across EBA and non-EBA banks are driven by this. We address this concern in two
ways. First, in the Online Appendix, we saturate our specification with country × year-quarter
fixed effects. This effectively ensures that we compare banks within a given country in a given year-
quarter. If exposure to the sovereign debt crisis is fixed at the country × year-quarter level, this
approach ensures that the estimated relative difference is not driven by the sovereign debt crisis.
Second, we conduct a placebo exercise (see Online Appendix) where we consider the difference in
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these robustness tests.
9In October 2012, the Liikanen (2012) report recommended a structural reform to ”reduce complexity, intercon-
nectedness, and size of large and complex banking groups”, which would likely target a similar set of banks as our
EBA bank sample. For example, this would entail a separation of trading and deposit-taking activities or the use
of bail-in instruments. Such recommendations were taken up only in January 2014 by the European commission
proposal COM/2014/043 and therefore lie outside of our sample range. Krahnen et al. (2017) provide an overview of
these proposals as well as U.S. equivalents. Due to these regulatory changes, we are careful in terms of interpreting
differences or non-differences between EBA and non-EBA banks well after the capital exercise as being solely due to
higher capital requirements.
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outcomes for EBA and non-EBA banks at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis.
Reassuringly, our main results are qualitatively robust to these alternative approaches.
B. Risk Measures
In our empirical analysis, we employ a battery of different measures of bank risk. While the
regulatory measure - the Core Tier 1 ratio - is relatively standard, we here briefly explain the set
of non-regulatory measures of risk. Many of these measures are based on equity prices and may
therefore be represented as a function of bank stock returns or prices. Some risk proxies are purely
market-based (volatility, beta, Value-at-Risk) and others are mixed measures (market leverage, z-
score, MES, ∆COVAR, SRISK) using both market and book data. Each measure is likely to be
an imperfect proxy for financial risk, however, looking at a broader suite of measures enables an
assessment of how market participants evaluate bank solvency.
VOLATILITY We calculate stock price volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock returns
in a given quarter (estimated on the basis of a rolling window of 100 days and averaged over each
quarter). Generally, the default risk of a bank could be associated with volatility, as the likelihood
that a bank’s equity values falls below or close to zero depends on its volatility. All else equal,
we therefore expect stock price volatility to decrease after a tightening of capital requirements if
banks are deemed safer due to more capital buffers. For example, under the assumption of risk-free
bank debt, increases in capital reduce overall book leverage and, given a stable asset value, should
therefore result in a lower risk to shareholders (cf. Sarin and Summers, 2016).
MARKET LEVERAGE Market leverage is the ratio of total assets (TA) minus book eq-
uity (EQ) plus market capitalization (MCAP) divided by the market capitalization of the
bank: MARKET LEVERAGE = TA-EQ+MCAPMCAP . We average daily market capitalization over
a given quarter and use reported quarterly values of total assets and book equity to compute
MARKET LEVERAGE. If bank equity market values remain constant, MARKET LEVERAGE
will likely decrease following the introduction of stricter capital requirements, either because banks
increase their equity proportion directly, or by shrinking overall assets (the latter option is supported
by the evidence from Gropp et al. (2019) and the results in subsection IV.A). However, if the mar-
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ket value of equity is declining, this can potentially dampen the effect on MARKET LEVERAGE
or even increase it.
BETA Systematic risk βEQ is the sensitivity of bank equity to market movements, calculated
as the covariance of a bank’s stock returns and market returns divided by the variance of market
returns. Daily betas are computed using a rolling window of 100 trading days and are averaged
for a given quarter. The market of interest is the European banking sector and thus, we use the
Datastream European Bank Index as our measure of market returns. The equity beta is often
referred to as “levered beta” as it is related to market leverage and a bank’s asset risk in the
following way (assuming debt is risk-free; cf. Baker and Wurgler (2015)): βEQ = βA
TA-EQ+MCAP
EQ =
βA ·MARKET LEVERAGE, where βA is the unlevered asset beta. Hence, both changes in βA and
changes in MARKET LEVERAGE will affect the systematic risk of a bank.
VALUE AT RISK We measure equity tail risk using the Value-at-Risk (VaR) at level α = 0.05,
defined as the 5th percentile of daily stock returns. We compute V aR using the historical method
based on a 100 day rolling window and take the average of daily values in a given quarter. The
estimated V aR5% is interpreted as the equity loss that is not exceeded with a 1 − α = 95%
confidence level. While V aR is a measure of tail risk, it is related to the overall distribution of
returns and therefore changes when the distribution shifts. As an example, when the underlying
return distribution is normal with mean µ and variance σ2, the V aR measure can be expressed as
V aRα = µ+ σzα, where zα is the α-quantile of the standard normal distribution (similar relations
hold true for, e.g., the Student t-distribution). If either the mean µ or the variance σ2 of the return
distribution shift as a result of the capital exercise, we expect to see respective changes in V aR
values.
INVERSE Z SCORE As a measure of default risk, we employ a bank’s (log) inverse
z-score. The z-score is defined as the ratio of return on assets (RoA) plus the equity ratio
(MCAP/TA) over the standard deviation of RoA (based on previous four quarter windows):
z-score = RoA + MCAP/TAσ4Q(RoA) . Such measure is sensitive to changes in a bank’s capital structure, via
market equity and overall asset growth or decline, as well as profitability and the variability of
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profits of the bank.10 In essence, it describes how many standard deviations of profitability can be
absorbed by the (market) equity and current profits and thus, how far a bank is from default. For
interpretation, we invert the z-score such that an increase implies higher default risk and take its log.
Finally, we use three measures that are often considered by the literature as proxies for various
aspects of systemic risk: (1) Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) (Acharya et al., 2017), (2) SRISK
(Acharya et al., 2012), and (3) ∆COVAR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). Further details on
the three systemic risk measures are given in the Online Appendix. Below, we summarize their
definition and how they are estimated.
MES As a measure of a bank’s systemic risk exposure we consider MES (see Acharya et al., 2017;
Brownlees and Engle, 2017), which is defined as the return on a bank’s equity during tail events of
the financial sector.11 To proxy for the European financial sector, we use the Datastream European
Bank Index. We follow the estimation model of Brownlees and Engle (2017) and employ the
dynamic “long-run”-MES as a proxy for a bank’s exposure to such systemic tail events. Daily MES
estimates are computed using TARCH and Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) specifications
(see Rabemananjara and Zaköıan, 1993; Engle, 2002) and are aggregated to the quarterly level by
averaging. Intuitively, MES can be viewed as a sensitivity to tail events in the banking sector. In
fact, as shown by Benoit et al. (2014), MES can be expressed as the product of a bank’s equity beta
and the expected shortfall of equity returns. Therefore, shifts in systematic risk or tail risk following
the capital exercise will ultimately influence MES. In our regressions, we ultimately use the long-
run MES (LRMES), which is proportional to MES. Specifically, LRMESi,t ≡ 1−exp (−18×MES).
LRMES is a measure of how sensitive the bank equity return is to a prolonged decline in market
returns.
∆COVAR We measure a bank’s contribution to systemic risk by looking at a bank’s ∆COVAR
(see Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)). The conditional ∆COVAR measures changes in the financial
10Note that we employ the market value of equity to calculate the equity ratio for z-score as we are interested
in the market-based component of the equity risk. However, taking the book equity is also possible and we use the
book-based version in unreported analyses. Since we do not find that EBA banks necessarily adjust their book values
of equity, the inverse z-score would only pick up changes in total assets, profitability, and its variability.
11Acharya et al. (2017) introduce the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), which consists of a linear combination
of MES and market leverage, which we consider above.
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system’s Value-at-Risk in case an individual bank’s VaR shifts from its median state to the extreme
left tail (i.e., when the bank is in distress). As we focus on the European banking market, we do not
use the state variables based on U.S.-level data as proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)
to estimate ∆COVAR. Instead, we consider appropriate European state variables, i.e., the change
in the Euro yield curve, the change between the ten-year Euro area yield rate and the three-month
Euro interest rate, the Euro Stoxx 50 return, real estate returns in excess of the Euro Stoxx 50
equity market, the short-term Treasury Bill Eurodollar spread and the change in the credit spread
VSTOXX.
SRISK Our final measure related to systemic risk is the estimated conditional capital shortfall.
The capital shortfall CSi,t of an institution i at time t is defined as
(2) CSi,t ≡ κ (Di,t + MCAPi,t)−MCAPi,t
where Di,t is book debt and MCAPi,t is the market-value of equity. The parameter κ is meant to
parametrize a prudential level of capital.12 A positive value of CSi,t indicates that the institution
has a positive capital shortfall, whereas an institution with a negative CSi,t is considered adequately
capitalized. The estimated conditional capital shortfall - or SRISK - of an institution is given by
(3) SRISKi,t ≡ κ×Di,t − (1− κ)× (1− LRMESi,t)×MCAPi,t
SRISK therefore captures, intuitively, how undercapitalized an institution is expected to be condi-
tional on a general (financial) market downturn. We calculate an institution’s SRISK by combining
quarterly balance-sheet and market information on Di,t and MCAPi,t, together with our own es-
timates of LRMES. SRISK captures an institution’s systemic relevance by providing an actual
estimate of the capital shortfall in a crisis.
12The parameter essentially captures when an institution is “short on capital” relative to their target market
leverage ratio. We follow Bostandzic and Weiß (2018) and compute bank-specific κ’s based on each institution’s
derivative assets and liabilities. Specifically, we compute the bank’s gross derivative usage, and, on a yearly basis,
divide banks into six equal groups based on the extent to which banks use derivative positions. We set κ = 5.5% for
banks with a high level of derivatives and κ = 8% for banks with a low level of gross derivatives.
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C. Data Sample
Our initial sample consists of all publicly traded European banks included in the active and dead
firm list in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. We consider a bank’s country to be the country
of its primary listing and only consider countries that have at least one bank designated as a ’EBA
bank’. All secondary listings and non-primary issues are excluded. This initial sample comprises a
total of 115 banks. Quarterly financial accounting data are taken from the SNL Financial database
and whenever quarterly data are missing, we cross-check and complement with data from Capital
IQ. Daily data on share prices, earnings per share, and number of shares are retrieved from Thomson
Reuters Financial Datastream. Due to the fact that Datastream suffers from well-known minor data
errors with regard to stock prices, we perform several screening-procedures as proposed by Ince and
Porter (2006) on the daily returns on banks’ stock prices. First, a minimum share price of EUR
1 is required for a bank to be included in our sample. Second, any return above 300 percent that
is reversed within one month is treated as missing. Also, we exclude a bank if the number of zero
return days is more than 80 percent in a given month of that year (see, e.g., Hou et al. (2011)).
Non-trading days are excluded from our sample, if 90 percent or more of the stocks listed on a
given exchange have a return equal to zero. Most of the bank stocks excluded this way have stock
prices below EUR 1 (19 in total); and others suffer from stale prices, i.e., Datastream reports them
as active stocks although they are inactive during the relevant time period (4 banks). Overall,
these filters reduce our sample to 92 banks. Finally, we follow Gropp et al. (2019) and exclude
seven banks from our sample that undergo “deep restructuring” or were acquired during the sample
period.13 In summary, due to our filters, the initial list of 115 bank stocks is reduced to our final
sample of 85 banks, which consists of 29 EBA banks (treatment group) and 56 non-EBA banks
(control group).14 Our sample runs from Q1:2010 to Q4:2013, but we collect market data starting
from 2009 (if available) in order to estimate some of the risk measures on a rolling basis. To ensure
the comparability within our sample of European banks, all stock market and accounting data are
collected in Euro.
13There are six Greek EBA banks (Attica Bank, Eurobank Ergasis, Bank of Piraeus, Alpha Bank, Bank of Greece,
National Bank of Greece) as well as one Belgian bank (Dexia), which were acquired by the state.
14The sample filters applied in Schmidt (2019) are similar to ours and comprise 31 EBA banks and 58 non-EBA
banks that have available data on analyst forecasts. In the Online Appendix, we show results from an analysis using
the full initial sample. The results are largely similar to the results shown for our main sample.
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Summary statistics for our main variables of interest as of Q4:2010 (cf. Gropp et al., 2019) are
presented in Table 1. The average CT1 capital ratio (CT1 RATIO) of EBA banks is 9.9%, while
non-EBA banks, on average, exhibit an almost 2 percentage point higher ratio in Q4:2010. The
mean CT1 RATIO for EBA banks is above the 9% level prescribed after the EBA capital exercise,
but there are number of banks that fall below the prescribed threshold prior to 2011. While the
treatment group is not assigned via total but the relative size of the bank in its country, we observe
that the average EBA bank has total assets of over EUR 600 billion versus ca. EUR 16 billion for
the average non-EBA bank. Thus, we also find that the overall capital shortfall is much higher for
EBA banks. For example, the maximum SRISK in the treatment group is around EUR 87 billion
while the highest value for the control group is only around EUR 9 billion. Similarly, systemic
risk contribution, measured via ∆COVAR, is three times higher for the average EBA bank and the
mean of the long-run MES is twice as high.
Market capitalization is magnitudes higher for EBA banks compared to banks in the control
group and thus, given the smaller amount of total assets, market leverage is twice as high for non-
EBA banks. Finally, EBA banks exhibit higher default risk, tail risk, and systematic risk, hold less
book equity, and are less profitable prior to the capital exercise in 2011. While there are differences
between EBA and non-EBA banks in terms of size and risk prior to the treatment, we emphasize
that our econometric setup does not assume similarity based on these pre-treatment characteristics.
Rather, our identifying assumption is a similar evolution of the various outcomes we consider in
absence of treatment.
IV. Capital Requirements and Bank Risk
In this section, we explore how capital requirements affect bank risk. We start this section by
documenting how EBA banks respond to the capital exercise in terms of (1) equity, (2) the risk
density of its assets15, and (3) total assets, and how the adjustment of these variables ultimately
affect banks’ Core Tier 1 ratio. The overall conclusion from section IV.A is that Core Tier 1
ratios increase. We then move on to investigate whether we observe a similar development in other
risk metrics (section IV.B). We document how non-regulatory market-based risk-metrics remain
15We define the risk density of assets as risk-weighted assets divided by total assets.
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Variable Sample N Mean SD Min Max
CT1 RATIO EBA 25 9.94 2.31 4.00 13.94
(in %) Non-EBA 46 11.78 3.90 5.96 21.38
MCAP EBA 28 42,644 66,829 1,420 290,297
(in million EUR) Non-EBA 56 2,579 7,682 5 45,229
MARKET LEVERAGE EBA 27 21.41 14.82 2.98 59.43
Non-EBA 46 46.47 70.11 1.63 338.41
VOLATILITY EBA 29 1.72 0.48 0.23 2.63
(in %) Non-EBA 56 1.99 0.65 1.06 5.09
BETA EBA 29 0.83 0.22 0.42 1.30
Non-EBA 56 0.25 0.26 -0.23 1.04
VALUE AT RISK5% EBA 29 -3.49 1.92 -12.95 -2.15
(in %) Non-EBA 56 -2.87 1.35 -9.06 -0.41
INVERSE Z SCORE EBA 26 1.17 3.56 0.06 18.50
Non-EBA 45 0.46 2.82 -12.79 10.05
LRMES EBA 29 58.83 11.62 37.50 93.10
(in %) Non-EBA 56 32.11 21.56 -15.48 78.78
∆COVAR EBA 29 -0.47 0.72 -2.27 0.94
(in %) Non-EBA 56 -0.15 0.25 -1.27 0.33
SRISK EBA 27 19,942 30,248 -26,175 87,430
(in million EUR) Non-EBA 46 -48 2,965 -14,912 8,998
TOTAL ASSETS EBA 27 625,901 659,609 20,248 1,998,158
(in million EUR) Non-EBA 46 16,540 34,245 137 214,684
EQUITY RATIO EBA 27 6.44 2.86 2.64 13.38
(in %) Non-EBA 46 9.27 3.89 2.62 17.63
ROA EBA 26 0.12 0.11 -0.02 0.49
(in %) Non-EBA 47 0.19 0.17 -0.20 0.73
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Q4:2010)
This table shows summary statistics of regulatory and non-regulatory risk measures, total assets,
return on assets, and equity ratios for a sample of 29 treated EBA banks and the control group of
56 non-EBA banks.
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unchanged or even spike after the introduction of stricter capital requirements.
A. How Do Banks Respond to Increased Capital Requirements?
Our point of departure is a similar analysis as conducted by Gropp et al. (2019), who document
how EBA banks responded to the EBA capital exercise. We start by showing how the capital ratio
of EBA banks changed as a result of the capital exercise. That is, we use the CT1 ratio as outcome
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Figure 1: This figure shows the evolution of the average Core Tier 1 (CT1) ratio of EBA banks relative to
non-EBA banks. Specifically, we plot the sequence of estimated {γk} from equation (1). Vertical bars
correspond to 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The picture is clear and consistent with Gropp et al. (2019). EBA banks significantly increase
their CT1 capital ratios at the onset of the capital exercise. On average, capital ratios had increased
by roughly 1.5 percentage points nine quarters after the EBA capital exercise, leaving EBA banks
significantly better capitalized compared to what they were before.
Next, we investigate how banks achieved this increase in capital ratios. In principle, banks can
adjust in three ways: (1) increasing equity, (2) decreasing assets, or (3) changing the composition
of assets such that the average risk-weight is lowered (i.e., “portfolio rebalancing”). Our outcome
variables are therefore the level of total (log) assets, the level of (log) equity, and the risk density,
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Figure 2: This figure shows the evolution of log(equity) (top row), log(assets) (mid row), and risk-weighted
assets divided by total assets (bottom row). We plot the sequence of estimated {γk} from equation (1).
Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Our results are broadly consistent with the findings of Gropp et al. (2019), despite stemming
from a slightly different sample. EBA banks reduce risk-weighted assets, while equity has a roughly
similar evolution across treatment and control banks in the short-term. The reduction in risk-
weighted assets is achieved by both a reduction in total assets over the longer-term (mid row), but
mainly a reduction in the overall risk density (bottom row). The latter indicates that not only do
capital requirements affect the overall level of credit, but also the allocation.
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A tentative conclusion based on this section is that higher capital requirements decreases the
risk-density of banks and increase banks’ CT1 ratio. Taken together, this suggests unambiguously
that bank solvency improves. According to standard financial theory, this should then also improve
other, market-based measures of risk. For instance, higher capital ratios should, all else equal, make
banks’ equity less responsive to movements in overall economic conditions. Reduced comovement
with the business cycle should reduce the required return on bank stock. However, banks’ response
to higher capital requirements can dampen or even reverse these effects. For instance, if banks
engage in portfolio rebalancing to assets that are more correlated with the state of the economy,
that could dampen the reduction in the systematic risk of bank equity. Moreover, shifts in bank
portfolios have implications for bank profitability. This seems especially relevant, given there are
potential losses in banks’ franchise value, a concern expressed by, e.g., Sarin and Summers (2016).
Changes in bank profitability can affect the market valuation of banks, which in turn affects several
risk-metrics. Therefore, we now move on to the main analysis of the paper, which consists of
investigating whether we also observe a decrease within a much broader set of non-regulatory
risk-metrics.
B. The Effects of Capital Requirements on Bank Risk
We start by considering three measures related to equity return risk: Value-at-Risk, systematic
risk, and stock return volatility. The relative evolution of these measures for EBA banks around
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Figure 3: This figure shows the evolution of V aR5%, systematic risk (beta), and stock return volatility. In
all panels, we plot the sequence of estimated {γk} from equation (1). Vertical bars correspond to 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Starting with the top row, there is a relative decline in Value-at-Risk for the treatment group
of EBA banks, which corresponds to increasing equity tail risk, i.e., the 5th percentile of equity
returns declines temporarily. In the quarters immediately after the capital exercise, absolute values
of V aR are up to 1-2% higher for banks that had to increase their CT1 capital ratios. In the
mid row, we observe the relative evolution of systematic risk βEQ, which also shows a relative
increase at the onset of the EBA capital exercise. Both measures, V aR and βEQ, exhibit elevated
20
risk for EBA banks for over six and eight quarters, respectively, but then revert back to similar
levels as for non-EBA banks in the longer-term. In the bottom row, we show that the relative
stock-return volatility of EBA banks does neither increase nor decrease significantly. The effect of
capital requirements on the idiosyncratic volatility is thus, inconclusive. An important observation,
however, is that there is no significant decline in volatility despite the increase on the CT1 ratio as
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Figure 4: This figure shows the evolution of SRISK, LRMES, and ∆COVAR. In all panels, we plot the
sequence of estimated {γk} from equation (1). Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
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Next, we move to the three systemic risk measures, with estimated effects shown in Figure 4.
In general, the findings for our systemic risk measures mirror the evolution of the effects on the
equity-based risk measures they are composed of. LRMES is a combination of beta and equity
tail risk and thus, we find the same pattern for LRMES as for its components: LRMES rises
sharply for EBA banks following the capital exercise in 2011 and remains elevated for over a year
until the treatment effect reverts to zero. The SRISK measure is proportional to LRMES and
therefore exhibits a similar evolution over time. The effect of the capital exercise on EBA banks’
∆COVAR is mixed. Initially, the overall risk relatively increases for the first three quarters (i.e.,















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9



























-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Quarters after EBA capital exericse
Figure 5: This figure shows the evolution of the inverse z-score and market leverage. In all panels, we plot
the sequence of estimated {γk} from equation (1). Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Finally, in Figure 5, we show the response of our two solvency measures to the increase in capital
requirements. In the top row, we show the evolution of the log of (inverse) z-score. As highlighted
in section III.C, this measure is a function of (1) the return on assets (RoA), (2) the market-based
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equity ratio (MCAP/TA), and (3) the standard deviation of RoA. In the bottom row, we show the
evolution of treatment effects for market leverage. Our estimates indicate that both the inverse
z-score and market leverage of EBA banks increase relative to non-EBA banks.
Summary of results The preceding analyses indicate that non-regulatory, market-based risk
measures are unchanged or elevated following the tightening of capital requirements, i.e., bank risk
for treated banks is (weakly) higher rather than lower. In the Online Appendix, we show that
this increase in relative risk is primarily driven by a larger increase in level of the various risk-
metrics rather than a smaller decline, providing support for the interpretation that higher capital
requirements in fact increase market-based measures of bank risk. These findings are consistent
with the descriptive evidence in Sarin and Summers (2016), and in sharp contrast to the results
in section IV.A, which indicate that higher capital requirements increase bank capital ratios and
reduces banks’ risk density. To the extent that these market-based measures are informative for
bank insolvency risk, then, our findings reveal that the overall impact of capital requirements on
bank risk is more complex compared to assessments based on regulatory capital ratios alone.
C. Robustness
To motivate our causal interpretation of the treatment effects shown in section IV.B, we perform
multiple robustness tests to validate our identifying assumption. All results from the robustness
tests are shown in the Online Appendix, but omitted here for brevity. Instead, we summarize the
robustness exercises without showing the full set of results. Our results remain largely unchanged
across the different robustness tests.
The first robustness exercise addresses the concern that our results are driven by exposure to
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. To alleviate such concern, we perform a falsification test where
we compare the evolution of our risk-metrics at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. If exposure
to the sovereign debt crisis is driving our main results, we would expect to see a similar evolution of
our risk metrics for this alternative sample period. We do not find such patterns. As an alternative
way of addressing this concern, we also saturate our specification with country × year-quarter
fixed effects, effectively ensuring that identification comes from comparing EBA with non-EBA
banks within the same country and time period. The results using this alternative specification is
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qualitatively similar to that reported in the main text.16
The next two robustness tests are analyses that focus on more narrow samples.17 For identifi-
cation, this ensures to a larger extent that we compare the evolution of risk-metrics across different
banks that are more similar in terms of observables. First, we restrict attention to the 29 EBA
banks only. As a measure of treatment intensity, we use the inverse of the Core Tier 1 ratio at
the end of 2010. The underlying idea behind this identification strategy is that banks with initial
higher capital ratio were less affected by the increase in capital requirements. Reassuringly, we also
find that within the EBA bank subsample, the non-regulatory risk metrics increase significantly
more for less capitalized banks, compared to banks that initially had higher capital ratios. This
lends support to the interpretation that the increase in risk-measures is not due to EBA status
per se, but the actual increase in capital requirements. Second, we compare the three EBA banks
closest to the thresholds in our sample with the three non-EBA banks just below the threshold for
each country.18 Within this sample, we find qualitatively similar results.
Due to the selection rule in the EBA capital exercise, we can also adopt a matching approach
where we match EBA and non-EBA banks based on observables. In the Online Appendix, we show
the estimated effect of the EBA capital exercise on our outcome variables replacing our original
control group with a matched control group. We adopt three different matching strategies: size
(market capitalization, SRISK and total assets), business model (deposit ratio, net interest margin,
loan ratio and RoA) and capitalization (Tier 1 ratio and market leverage). Matching is done based
on end-of 2010 values of the respective matching variables. We find qualitatively similar results
across all matching strategies compared to the results reported in the main text.19
Finally, we repeat our main tests using an extended sample of banks to ensure that our esti-
mates are not specific to our selected sample. In particular, we do not exclude banks with share
prices below EUR 1 during the sample period and also keep the seven banks that experienced
“deep restructuring” during the time period (see Gropp et al., 2019).20 The results remain both
16The only exception is the impact of higher capital requirements on stock price volatility. According to our
estimates, shown in the Online Appendix, stock price volatility declines. In our main set of results, this effect is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
17We thank the anonymous referee for these suggestions.
18Whenever a country has less than three banks just above or just below, we include all of them.
19We retain the matching exercise as a robustness exercise due to the small number of uniquely matched control
banks for each EBA bank.
20Results using this broader sample are given in the Online Appendix.
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qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results in the main text.
All in all, these robustness tests lend support for our identifying assumption of similar outcomes
for EBA banks and non-EBA banks in absence of the capital requirement increase during and
shortly after the exercise.
V. Capital Requirements and the Market Valuation of Banks
Our findings so far indicate that market-based measures of bank solvency remain unchanged or
even increase after the EBA capital exercise, despite an increase in banks’ CT1 ratio and a reduction
in banks’ risk density. In this section, we explore why this is the case. As highlighted in section
III.C, some of our risk measures are functions of (changes in) the market value of bank equity. The
debate concerning how banks are affected by higher capital requirements has also primarily focused
on banks’ franchise values (Sarin and Summers, 2016; Gao et al., 2018; Bogdanova et al., 2018).
Our focus of this section is therefore on two questions. Do higher capital requirements have an
impact on banks’ market capitalization and, if so, why?
A. The Impact of Higher Capital Requirements on Banks’ Market Capitaliza-
tion
We start by investigating whether higher capital requirements affect banks’ market capitaliza-
tion. Figure 6 shows the dynamic treatment effects from estimating equation (1) using (log) market
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Figure 6: This figure shows the sequence of estimated {γk} from equation (1) using the log of
market capitalization as outcome variable. Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The estimated coefficients suggest that market values of EBA banks decline significantly relative
to non-EBA banks following the EBA capital exercise.
This decline in market capitalization can explain the evolution of non-regulatory risk metrics
documented in section IV.B. For example, an equity market loss combined with only slight reduc-
tions in total assets, increases the market leverage and default risk (INVERSE Z SCORE) of banks.
Consequently, the evolution of risk measures such as LRMES, SRISK, or BETA, which can in part
be presented as functions of market leverage, are also affected - consistent with a permanent EBA
bank equity devaluation.21
21The initial increase and subsequent reversion of the equity beta over time documented above may be explained
by an initial increase in market leverage that is later reversed by a reduction in a bank’s asset risk (e.g., by the cut in
lending and subsequent reduction of risk-weighted assets by EBA banks in response to tighter capital requirements
(see Gropp et al., 2019)). For example, if systematic risk can be expressed as βEQ = βA · MARKET LEVERAGE
(see section III.B), then the increase in MARKET LEVERAGE could have been counterbalanced in the longer-term
by reducing a bank’s asset risk exposure βA. Note that this potential explanation only holds in the absence of other
forces driving bank decisions in the longer-term. To allow causal inference from this single event, our identifying
assumption needs to hold for the whole period of eight quarters following the capital exercise. The longer the time
period after the exercise, the stronger our assumption is.
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B. Channels Through Which Higher Capital Requirements Affect Market Cap-
italization
We now explore why higher capital requirements reduce banks’ market capitalization. A deval-
uation of EBA banks’ equity can occur for a number of reasons. In the following, we consider three
potential explanations: (1) changes in any subsidy from implicit or explicit government guarantees,
(2) changes in bank dividends, and (3) changes in bank profitability. Understanding which of these
channels are important for the decline in EBA banks market capitalization is central in order to
evaluate the welfare effects of higher capital requirements. For instance, if it arises from a reconsid-
eration of implicit or explicit too-big-to-fail subsidies, the decline in market values and associated
increase in bank risk can be good from a social planner’s perspective. If, on the other hand, higher
capital requirements reduce market capital and increase bank risk due to lower profitability, it leave
banks less solvent without any associated positive effects.
Too-big-to-fail Subsidies To assess whether higher capital requirements reduce implicit or ex-
plicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidies for EBA banks, we follow Noss and Sowerbutts (2012) and
focus on rating agencies’ subjective judgment of the likelihood of government intervention. The
Fitch Solutions database provides explicit “support ratings” for a subset of our banks. The support
ratings are supposed to capture ’a potential supporter’s propensity to support a bank and of its
ability to support it’.22 We have data on support ratings for a subsample of 37 banks, of which
20 are EBA banks. We focus on 2011 (starting before the capital exercise) and onwards due to
data accessibility. We use our data on support ratings to assess whether they change significantly
for EBA banks relative to non-EBA banks during the treatment period.23 For the sake of inter-
pretability, we follow Gropp et al. (2011) and assign a direct mapping from support ratings to
bailout probabilities. Implied probabilities of bailouts for EBA and non-EBA banks are shown in
22 Note that Fitch bank support ratings “do not assess the intrinsic credit quality of a bank” but rather “[. . . ]
communicate the agency’s judgment on whether the bank would receive support should this become necessary.” (cf.
https://info.creditriskmonitor.com/Help/FitchGlossary.asp)
23Measuring implied bailout probabilities is empirically challenging. In the Online Appendix, we follow an alter-
native approach that captures implied bailout probabilities by computing bank-specific put option spreads (see Kelly
et al., 2016) as these may indicate whether a bank stock’s crash insurance carries a TBTF premium. However, option
data on banks in our sample are even more scarce than ratings data (i.e., 15 EBA banks and 6 non-EBA banks) and
thus, we only refer to these results as additional support for our findings. The results following that approach are
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Figure 7: Bailout probabilities for a sample of 20 EBA banks and 17 non-EBA banks. The
probabilities are based on Fitch’s support rating of the respective banks. The support ratings are
then mapped to bailout probabilities, following Gropp et al. (2011).
Figure 7 shows average bailout probabilities of EBA versus non-EBA banks. Banks in the former
group tend to have a higher average bailout probability throughout the sample period. However,
considering the evolution of those probabilities, there are no clear changes in the estimated bailout
probabilities surrounding the EBA capital exercise.24 If stricter capital requirements imposed lower
bailout probabilities, it is likely that we would observe a more significant drop in such probability
for banks affected by the exercise. To the extent that the credit rating agencies support rating and
the expectations of other market participants coincide, we argue that it is unlikely that a change in
the TBTF subsidy can explain the observed reduction in bank equity market values for the whole
sample of treated banks.
Dividends Theoretically, the impact of dividend reductions on market valuations is ambiguous.
However, a large literature starting from Bhattacharya (1979) focuses on the positive comovement
between dividends and share prices. In light of this literature, a simple explanation for an immediate
drop in the market value of bank equity may therefore be that EBA banks temporarily postpone
dividend payouts. We note that the lack of relative increase in equity as documented in section
24In specific, there are only seven banks that experience a change in support ratings during our sample period.
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IV.A is inconsistent with a large reduction in dividend payouts. However, due to for instance equity
injections and losses, the path of equity can differ from the path of dividend payouts. Here, we
therefore investigate the impact of the EBA capital exercise on dividend payouts directly.25 To
exclude changes in dividends due to changes in net income, we scale dividends by net income and
focus on the dividend payout ratio.
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Figure 8: This figure shows the evolution of median dividends paid relative to net income for
EBA and non-EBA banks.
The evolution of median dividend payouts is largely the same for treatment and control group.
Dividend payouts in 2011 are slightly higher for both groups compared to the end of 2010, which
is inconsistent with drops in dividend payouts driving market equity drops after the exercise. In
2012, we observe an overall decrease in median dividends payments, and EBA banks have a slightly
higher drop in the dividends to net income. While this is consistent with market capitalization
declining in general, it does not explain the overall differential evolution of market equity values
of EBA banks versus non-EBA banks. It is therefore unlikely that it can explain the differential
decline in market equity values for EBA banks.
25Investigating the impact of the EBA capital exercise on dividends, however, is challenging due to data limitations,
as dividend payout is inherently an annual variable. Hence our sample only contains four dividend-observations per
bank.
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Bank profitability Finally, as the last potential explanation for why the market capitalization
of EBA banks drop, we investigate how the capital exercise affects bank profitability. Given the
portfolio rebalancing documented in subsection IV.A, it is plausible that higher capital requirements
influence overall bank profitability as banks may have had to cut down on loans that may exhibit
positive net cash flow. For that purpose, we plot the evolution of the treatment effect on RoA using
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Figure 9: This figure shows the sequence of estimated {γk} from equation (1) using Return on
Assets (RoA) as outcome variable. Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
While the two groups may have a relatively similar trend in RoA prior to the capital exercise,
there is a systematic difference between treatment and control groups at the onset of the capital
exercise. EBA banks exhibit a significantly lower RoA compared to non-EBA banks and this
difference persists throughout and after the capital exercise. A relative devaluation of EBA bank
stocks is consistent with such relative loss in profitability for EBA banks.
Putting it all together To summarize the analysis above, we estimate the following static
difference-in-differences regression:
(4) Yi,t = Postt + EBAi + γ × (Postt × EBAi) + εi,t,
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1 2 3 4 5
Log(Market capitalization) RoA Dividends / Net Income Bailout probability Net income (thousands EUR)
Postt × EBAi -0.264* -0.000667** -44.81 0.00218 -410599.7**
(0.148) (0.000305) (50.73) (0.0428) (156059.3)
N 1,344 1,210 1,300 510 1,333
Clusters 14 13 14 13 13
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Putting It All Together: Static Difference-in-differences
This table shows the results from estimating equation (4). Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the country level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
where γ is the coefficient of interest. γ captures the average change in the outcomes we consider for
EBA banks relative to non-EBA banks over the capital exercise period. As our outcome variables
Yi,t, we consider log(market capitalization), Return on Assets, Dividends / Net Income, the implied
bailout probability based on bank support ratings, and raw net income.
Consistent with Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, there is a statistically significant relative decline both
in market capitalization and RoA for EBA banks during the capital exercise. Moreover, the drop
in RoA is associated with a decline in Net income (column 5). In contrast, there is no significant
impact on dividends and bailout probability. Overall, we therefore conclude that the decline in
market capitalization is most consistent with a reduction in bank profitability.26
How big is the reduction in return on assets? The coefficient estimate implies that the (annual-
ized) RoA for EBA banks is on average approximately 27 basis points lower after the EBA capital
exercise is initiated. Compared to a pre-EBA (end of 2010) average (annualized) RoA of 50 basis
points, the point estimate therefore implies that RoA for EBA banks fell by roughly 55 % during
the capital exercise. A rough back-of-the-envelope calculation of how much this decline in RoA can
explain of the decline in market capitalization suggests that approximately 30 % of the decline in
market capitalization can be explained by the reduction in bank profitability.27
26Note that a reduction in RoA does not necessarily imply a reduction in profitability per se. Higher capital ratios
could lead to a lower required return on loans and hence induce banks to extent marginally less profitable loans.
Note, however, that this would imply an increase in net income. Hence, the coefficient estimate in column 5 of Table
2 is a more direct way to estimate the impact on profitability.
27 Specifically, we calculate this number by using a dividends growth formula, i.e., we assume that the stock price
of a bank is given by P = D
r
where P is the stock price, D is future dividends and r is the effective discount rate,
i.e., the difference between the cost of equity and the growth rate of dividends. Normalizing the number of shares
to 1, this formula allows us to decompose how changes in dividends affect changes in market capitalization. We use
pre-EBA data on dividends and market cap to calibrate a r = 0.03. We then assume a fixed dividend share of 34% of
net income, equal to the pre-EBA median payout ratio of EBA banks. Moreover, we assume that this payout ratio
is fixed in line with the estimates from Table 2. Armed with these assumptions, we use the estimated drop in net
income from the last column in Table 2 to back out an implied drop in market capital. The drop implied drop in
market capital is equal to dP = 0.34×(−0.410)
0.03
= −4.6 billion EUR. The observed drop in the level of market capital
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VI. Policy Implications
The empirical analysis in this paper has documented that an increase in capital requirements
leads to an increase in bank risk without reducing market assessment of implicit and explicit
government guarantees. From a policy perspective, a crucial question is therefore whether there
are other policies that are more efficient in terms of reducing banks’ risk. Two papers, focusing on
the impact of alternative interventions on systemic risk, are especially relevant for this purpose.
Berger et al. (2020) analyze the effect of participation in the U.S. TARP on systemic risk
measures. In relation to this, Nistor Mutu and Ongena (2018) analyze the effects on systemic risk
for a set of international episodes of recapitalizations, liquidity injections, and public guarantees.28
A broad conclusion from both papers is that pure recapitalizations decrease systemic risk. Hence, a
tentative conclusion from these papers and the analysis we present is that directed recapitalization
is more effective in terms of reducing bank risk, compared to increased capital requirements.29 This
provides novel support for the key principles of bank capital regulation outlined in Greenwood et al.
(2017), which emphasizes the need to regulate capital rather than capital ratios, especially after
adverse shocks.
A key challenge is that, even though public recapitalizations are potentially successful in terms
of reducing bank risk, banks’ raise too little capital during a downturn if left to their own de-
vices (Sarin and Summers, 2016). One potential explanation for this is equity/dividend signaling
(Juelsrud and Nenov, 2019).30 In that case, policies which force private recapitalizations such as
is approximately 16 billion EUR. We therefore conclude that the implied drop in market cap due to a drop in net
income can account for ca. −4.6−16 = 29%.
28For example, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) provide evidence that banks with higher management compen-
sation were less likely to apply for TARP funding, i.e., there was a possible self-selection, or even get rejected more
frequently.
29Why is a recapitalization like TARP more successful in terms of reducing systemic risk compared to the EBA
capital exercise? A few key differences between TARP and the EBA capital exercise are worth highlighting. First,
banks that applied for the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) as part of TARP received an equity injection from the
government in order to increase their capital levels to comply with respective regulations. In our setting, banks are
left with several options to comply with required capital levels. As Gropp et al. (2019) and we show, EBA banks
reduce risky lending in order to shrink asset size rather than raising capital. This in turn have implications for the
value of bank capital. Second, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show that distressed U.S. banks that applied for
TARP had a generally high asset quality and that participation in the program had a positive effect after respective
stress test results (“SCAP”) had been released. We do not observe similar “certification effects” for EBA banks.
Third, due to the nature of the CPP, the U.S. government owned preference shares of participating banks and thus,
played a major role in monitoring bank activities as a shareholder. This is not the case in the EBA capital exercise
where governments and regulators were more passive.
30According to this view, banks are reluctant to privately raise capital by cutting dividends or issuing equity
during a liquidity crisis due to asymmetric information between short-term lenders and the bank. In a such setting,
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dividend restrictions or policies that fosters public recapitalization such as direct equity injections
can improve financial stability.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we use the EBA capital exercise of 2011 as a quasi-natural experiment to inves-
tigate how capital requirements affect various measures of bank solvency risk. We show that while
regulatory measures of solvency improve, non-regulatory measures show, if anything, a deteriora-
tion in bank solvency in response to higher capital requirements. This decline in bank solvency is
driven by a decline in the banks’ market value of equity. When exploring the channels behind our
findings, we conclude that EBA bank stock devaluations are most consistent with a reduction in
bank profitability, rather than a repricing of bank equity due to a reduction of implicit and explicit
too-big-too-fail guarantees.
Our paper suggests that the overall judgment as to whether higher capital requirements improve
solvency is less obvious than perhaps initially thought. An important avenue for future research is
to consider the impact of other post-crisis policy measures on bank risk, such as liquidity require-
ments. It is possible that the liquidity and funding regulation that has accompanied higher capital
requirements have made the financial system less fragile. In order to shed light on the overall im-
pact of post-crisis capital and liquidity requirement on the fragility of the financial system, further
research is required.
raising capital can precipitate a liquidity crisis, as it is interpreted as bad news by short-term lenders. Because of
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Fraisse, H., M. Lé, and D. Thesmar (2017): “The real effects of bank capital requirements,”
Working Paper.
Gao, Y., S. Liao, and X. Wang (2018): “Capital markets assessment of the economic impact of
the Dodd Frank Act on systemically important financial firms,” Journal of Banking & Finance,
86, 204–223.
Gehrig, T. and M. C. Iannino (2018): “Capital regulation and systemic risk in the insurance
sector,” Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 10, 237–263.
Greenwood, R., S. G. Hanson, J. C. Stein, and A. Sunderam (2017): “Strengthening and
Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity.
Gropp, R., H. Hakenes, and I. Schnabel (2011): “Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public
Bail-out Policies,” Review of Financial Studies, 24(6), 2084–2120.
Gropp, R., T. Mosk, S. Ongena, and C. Wix (2019): “Banks Response to Higher Capital
Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment,” Review of Financial Studies, 32(1),
266–299.
35
Haldane, A. G. and V. Madouros (2012): “The dog and the frisbee,” Revista de Economı́a
Institucional, 14, 13–56.
Hou, K., G. A. Karolyi, and B.-C. Kho (2011): “What Factors Drive Global Stock Returns?”
Review of Financial Studies, 24(8), 2527–2574.
Ince, O. and R. Porter (2006): “Individual Equity Return Data From Thomson Datastream:
Handle With Care!” Journal of Financial Research, 29, 463–479.
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